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THE ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS
By NEWMIAN F. BAKER*
I. NECESSITY FOR A BOARD OF APPEALS
F it were possible to frame a perfect zoning ordinance there
would be no necessity for a zoning board of appeals, but per-
fect ordinances never have been and probably never will be
passed. It is easy to underrate the technical difficulties in draw-
ing up zoning ordinances. To prepare use and bulk maps for the
various sections of the city, to calculate height limitations, and to
plan the future expansion of the city, keeping in mind the promo-
tion of municipal aesthetics and at the same time protecting, so
far as possible, the property rights of the individual, is an almost
superhuman task. Fortunately, most of the larger cities have
employed experts to assist the local authorities in accomplishing
their purpose. But, nevertheless, experience shows that zoning
ordinances need adjustment and modification after being put into
operation.
It has been said that "a defective or deficient zone ordinance is
probably as fertile a source of disturbance and maladjustment as
a public body can create."' It is extremely difficult to avoid mis-
takes in the highly technical language necessary in such ordinances
and it is well known that even ordinary legislation does not always
avoid vague and unintelligible expressions. Moreover, it is often
perplexing to define the words used in these ordinances, many of
which are in common use, such as "street," "alley," "block," and
"structure. ' ' 2 Many ordinances are passed with the framers
*Special Assistant Corporation Counsel, City of Chicago; Graduate
Fellow, University of Chicago Law School.
'Sumner, The Board of Adjustment as a Corrective in Zoning Prac-
tice (April, 1924) 13 Nat. Mun. Rev. 203.2See Washington Square Ass'n v. Mann, (1925) 125 Misc. Rep. 294.
210 N. Y. S. 267; People ex rel. Beinert v. Miller, (1917) 100 Misc. Rep.
318, 165 N. Y. S. 602.
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merely speculating as to the future growth, and it is well known
that cities do not always grow in the way that they are planned.
Those who are employed to zone the city and to forecast the future
development may be led to provide for business and residence
districts in sections as yet unimproved. If the city should not
grow as predicted the rules drawn up become, in most cases, arbi-
trary and unenforceable. The city's zoning ordinance must be
comprehensive and city-wide in application and, as a result, it is
impossible to provide for the details of the great number of ex-
ceptional cases which every builder knows must arise. The zoning
ordinance might require the leaving of open spaces which are un-
necessary, due to the location of the lot. The ordinance might
forbid the use of a lot for business, when no other use is practica-
ble. On the other hand, the ordinance might allow a garage to be
built near a school or a hospital, a location not in spirit with the
purpose of the ordinance, though legal. Very often we find lots
of odd sizes and shapes where conformity is out of the question
and it is almost impossible to provide by ordinance for the innum-
erable questions that arise when old buildings are rebuilt or ex-
tended, and adaptation is necessary.
The purpose of a board of appeals or adjustment is "to safe-
guard the rights of individuals by providing a convenient remedy
against the arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of the police
power. ' '3 This board is created to keep the law "running on an
even keel" 4 by interpreting vague expressions, defining unintelligi-
ble ones, and by deciding exceptional cases, "where, owing to
special conditions, a literal enforcement of the provisions of the
ordinance will result in unnecessary hardship, and so that the spirit
of the ordinance shall be observed and substantial justice done."'
Mr. Edward M. Bassett, counsel for the Zoning Committee of
New York, uses this illustration to show the necessity for the board
of appeals :"
"An outlying unbuilt district may properly be zoned as resi-
dential. In it there may be a hill composed of good sand for
cement blocks. It is both economy and common sense that some
3Sumner, The Board of Adjustment as a Corrective in Zoning Prac-
tice, 13 Nat. Mun. Rev. 203.
4See Present Day Problems in Zoning (1924) Bulletin Mass. Fed. of
Planning Boards p. 13.
5 Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (1924) Dept. of Commerce.
section 7, p. 10.
OBassett, The Board of Appeals in Zoning (1921) Pub. by the Zoning
Committee of New York, p. 6.
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board should have the authority to permit the temporary use of
cement blockmaking. The ordinance should give such power to a
board of appeals. If there is no board of appeals, the council
itself would have to consider the question of altering the sand hill
from a residence district to an unrestricted district so that the
cement block works might be built and operated. But this change
would open up the locality for a chemical factory or some other
nuisance factory that might later prevent the upbuilding of the
district with good residences. The other horn of the dilemma
would be for the council to make a specific exception for the sand
hill and allow cement blocks to be made temporarily. Where,
however, the council itself goes into the field of making specific
exceptions for particular plots or buildings all over the city, it
would mean the breakdown of the zoning ordinance. The best
way to handle the subject is for the council to control the ordinance
and maps which should be as permanent as possible, and a board
of appeals should exercise discretion on specific permits of excep-
tional character."
It has been objected by some that the board of appeals is made
into a legislative body instead of being quasi-judicial body, and as
such its functions are illegal. As will be pointed out later, the
board is not empowered to change the ordinance but to authorize
"such variance from the terms of the ordinance as will not be
contrary to the public interest." 7 Whenever the board has ren-
dered a decision obviously against the will of the legislative body
the courts make it a practice to quash such proceedings. 8
Another objection commonly voiced is that errors should be
corrected and exceptions made by the city council instead of by
the board of appeals. In other words, the wrong should be cor-
rected by amendment rather than by variance from the ordinance.
In theory this may be true but this would not give proper relief
because the process of amendment is too slow and expensive.
We should note that the vested interests of those who comply
with the zoning ordinances are protected by making the process
of changing the ordinance more difficult than the passage of an
ordinary local law, an extraordinary majority being required in
case of protest by a small percentage of the adjoining owners.
We can expect to hear charges of favoritism made against
boards of appeals. The number of members usually is small and
there are opportunities for arbitrary and biased decisions. "If,
7Standard Act supra, sec. 7, p. 10.8See People ex rel. Sheldon v. Board of Appeals, (1922) 115 Misc.
Rep. 449, 189 N. Y. S. 772.9Standard Act supra, sec. 5, p. 7. See Matter of Palmer v. Mann.
(1923) 206 App. Div. 484, 201 N. Y. S. 525.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
however, a city administration is not competent to establish a good
board of appeals it is not competent to administer a zoning or-
dinance fairly." 10  It is usual to find the board of appeals com-
posed of members chosen from the technical professions allied to
the building industry. This group of men, skilled in the building
trades, visiting the premises in question for personal inspection,
has proved to be far more competent than the city council in con-
sidering exceptional cases. 1 As was stated by the court in People
ex rel. Broadway Realty Co. v. Walsh :12
"The procedure of appeal within the line of administrative
officials before allowing recourse to the courts, insures the bene-
fit of trained and competent expert opinion and judgment, aiplied
to the facts of each particular case by an experienced tribunal,
which is not limited to an affirmance or reversal of the action of
the superintendent of buildings, but may use its judgment in mak-
ing such modification in his action as in its opinion should be
made, and to that end is vested with his powers, in order that the
spirit of the law shall be observed, public safety secured and sub-
1tantial justice done."
Land owners do not desire to go to court and are "not seeking
to overturn a sensible zoning plan." Nor do land owners desire
to await the action of the city council to amend the law in their
favor. As a general thing they are satisfied to have a boaxrd of
experts hear their grievances and vary the strict letter of the
zoning law if they can show that they have claims of merit. There
is no other or better method for providing for the "orderly, legiti-
mate flexibility which zoning administration requires" than
through a board of appeals.
The chief value of the board of appeals in zoning is in pro-
tecting the ordinance from attacks upon its constitutionality.
Zoning is done under the police power and must have some rela-
tion to the public health, safety, morals, or the general welfare
of the community. Nearly all cases hold that the constitutionality
of zoning depends upon the reasonableness of the ordinance and
its freedom from arbitrary rulings. If there is no board of ap-
peals, the landowner can obtain a writ of mandamus against the
local official who grants building permits, and this brings the
lOBassett, The Board of Appeals in Zoning Pub. by the Zoning Com-
mittee of New York, p. 23.
"The Greater New York Charter sec. 718 (1) requires an architect.
structural engineer, and builder to be included in the board and the chair-
man must be an architect or a structural engineer. The Chicago board
is composed of five men: an architect, a structural engineer, a builder, a
real estate dealer, and a lawyer.
12(1923) 203 App. Div. 468, 474, 196 N. Y. S. 672.
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question of the reasonableness of the ordinance directly before the
courts and the ordinance may be declared unconstitutional in that
particular case. After an ordinance has proved defective in sev-
eral instances it is likely that it will be declared void as a whole.
In the case of Isenbarth v. Bartnett" the petitioner's property
had been zoned residential when the street it faced was undoubted-
ly a business street, being a main thoroughfare between railroad
stations and having three trolley lines. The value of the peti-
tioner's property for residential purposes was from $15,000 to
$17,000, as compared to its value of $55,000 for business purposes.
Moreover, it seems that the petitioner's property had been zoned
residential to preserve the vista of a private park at the rear of the
premises in question. In a suit for a mandamus to the building
inspector the court held that the zoning resolution was "legally
unreasonable." In California no board of appeals has been pro-
vided by statute and the same court that decided two leading cases
in favor of the constitutionality of zoning"4 held invalid an or-
dinance of a California city which designated only one and one-
tenth acres out of 2,500 acres as "unrestricted territory,""1 all
three decisions being made on the same day. A zoning ordinance
of Omaha, Nebraska, provided that buildings, erected within a
certain district, could cover only twenty-five per cent of the lot.
The relators in State ex rel. Westminster Presbyterian Church v.
Edgcomb'6 desired to build a church which would cover thirty-
seven and one-half per cent of the lot. Having no board of ap-
peals to make adjustments, the permit was refused and upon
appeal to the courts, the ordinance was held unconstitutional. An
ordinance of the city of Mount Vernon, New York, established a
zoning line between the residential and business districts which
traversed at an angle the lot owned by the petitioner in the case
of Hecht-Dann v. Burden." The result of this districting was to
13(1923) 206 App. Div. 546, 201 N. Y. S. 383, 911, affd., (1924) 237
N. Y. 617, 143, N. E. 765.
-Miller v. Board of Public Works, (Cal. 1925) 234 Pac. 381; Zahn v.
Board of Public Works, (Cal. 1925) 234 Pac. 388.
15Ex parte White, (Cal. 1925) 234 Pac. 396.
16(1922) 108 Neb. 859, 189 N. W. 617.
17(1924) 124 Misc. Rep. 632, 208 N. Y. S. 299. See Cooper Lumber
Co. v. Dammers, (N. J. 1924) 125 At. 325; City of Utica v. Hanna, (1922)
202 App. Div. 610, 195 N. Y. S. 225; Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of
Euclid, Ohio, (N. D. Ohio 1924) 297 Fed. 307; Lucas v. State ex rel.
Abt, (1923) 21 Ohio Law Bulletin and Reporter 363; Fitzhugh v. Jack-
son, (1923) 132 Miss. 585, 97 So. 190; Prince v. Board of Adjustment of
Town of Montclair, (N. J. 1925) 129 At. 123; Plymouth Co. v. Bigelow.
(N. J. 1925) 129 Atl. 203.
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make it practically impossible to use the petitioner's land for resi-
dential purposes and absolutely impossible to erect a residence
thereon, leaving a set-back of twenty-five feet as required by the
ordinance. In this case the courts allowed a mandamus to issue
and declared the ordinance to be unreasonable and not a "well con-
sidered plan" as required by statute. In the above cases it is un-
doubted that adjustments might have been made to relieve the
arbitrariness of the ordinances had there been application to a
board of appeals for adjustment.
In the case of Allen v. City of Paterson's we find that the
board of appeals for the city of Paterson, New Jersey, had varied
from the strict letter of the zoning ordinance and had allowed an
owner to build a garage seven and one-half feet from the street,
his lot not permitting its construction fourteen feet therefrom in
strict compliance with the ordinance. This action of the board,
being auhorized by statute,'19 was upheld, whereas it is probable
that the ordinance would have been held unconstitutional had no
adjustment been made. The court in People ex rel. Facey v. Leo20
upheld the action of the New York board of appeals in granting a
permit for a garage in a residence district. In this case there were
car barns across the street and two other garages near by and the
"spirit of the ordinance was not violated."'"
Commenting upon the necessity for a zoning board of appeals,
Mr. Bassett made this statement :22
"In New York State, where the zoning plan has been adopted
for the last six or seven years, in many cities there is no doubt
that the courts would have punched holes through every zoning
plan unless the city had a Board of Appeals. A Board of Appeals
acts like a safety valve. Where there is no Board of Appeals to
inject a sensible amount of adaptation in exceptional cases, the
courts say that the zoning is void in that particular case because
it is confiscatory or discriminatory. In New York City the Board
18(1924) 98 N. J. L. 661, 121 Atl. 610; affd. 99 N. J. L. 489, 123 At.
884. 19N. J. Laws 1921, ch. 82.
20(1921) 110 Misc. Rep. 516, 180 N. Y. S. 553; affd. 193 App. Div.
910, 184 N. Y. S. 943, affd. 230 N. Y. 602, 130 N. E. 910.
21See People ex rel. Helvetia Realty Co. v. Leo, (1921) 183 N. Y. S.
37; affd. 195 App. Div. 887, 185 N. Y. S. 949; 231 N. Y. 619. 132 N. E.
912; People ex rel. Healy v. Leo, (1920) 194 App. Div. 973. 185 N. Y. S.
948; People ex rel. McAvoy v. Leo, (1919) 109 Misc. Rep. 255. 178 N. Y. S.
513; Barker v. Boettger. (1924) 124 Misc. Rep. 461. 208 N. Y. S. 295:
People ex rel. Parry v. Walsh, (1923) 121 Misc. Rep. 631, 202 N. Y. S. 48.22Proposed Amendment to the Illinois Zoning Enabling Act (Pre-
ceded by a statement as to the need of the amendment by Mr. Bassett)
(1923) Chicago Real Estate Board p. 4.
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of Appeals has passed on at least one thousand cases, deciding
somewhat less than half of these cases in favor of the applicant.
If there had been no Board of Appeals, there is no doubt that
from twenty to fifty adverse decisions would have been made by
the courts against the zoning ordinance. Instead of this, the ad-
justing power of the Board of Appeals has brought it about that
not one single word of criticism against any provision of the zon-
ing ordinince has been made by any court regarding the zoning
plain of New York City. In states that have no Boards of Appeals
the courts are more and more rapidly handing down decisions that
are upsetting the zoning."
In conclusion we might say that in the majority of the states
the constitutionality of zoning is no longer questioned,2 3 but the
strength of the law depends upon its enforcement. The board
of appeals has been a very important factor in the continued
popularity of the zoning movement and by its adjustment of diffi-
culties and the interpretation of provisions it has given the zoning
ordinance the needed elasticity which would otherwise be lacking.
II. THE CHICAGO BOARD OF APPEALS
In 1921 the Illinois legislature passed an enabling act provid-
ing for the zoning of Illinois municipalities. This act required
the establishment of a zoning board of appeals as follows :2-
"Section 3. All ordinances passed under the terms of this
Act shall be enforced by such officer of the city, village or incor-
porated town as may be designated by ordinance. Each city, vil-
lage or incorporated town exercising the powers conferred by this
Act shall provide by ordinance for the creation of a board of ap-
peals of not less than three members nor more than five members
to be appointed in the same manner as the zoning commission.
Such board of appeals shall have power: (a) Upon application
to review the actions of the enforcing officer of the city, village
or incorporated town in order to determine whether they are in
accordance with the terms of ordinances enacted under the terms
of this Act; (b) To recommend to the city council or board of
trustees such ordinances or amendments as it may deem necessary
or desirable, including power in specific cases of particular hard-
ship to recommend variations of the original ordinance or amend-
ments thereto. Variations from or amendments to ordinances en-
acted under the terms of this Act shall in all cases be made by
ordinance.
"Section 4. The regulations imposed and the districts created
under the authority of this Act may be varied or amended from
23See Baker, Constitutionality of Zoning Laws, (November. 1925) 20
111. L. Rev. 213.
24111. Laws 1921, pp. 180-181.
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time to time by ordinance after the ordinance establishing same
has gone into effect, but no such variations or amendments shall
be made without a hearing before the board of appeals, pro-
vided for by section 3 hereof. Such board shall give notice and
proceed in the same manner as is provided by section 2 with
respect to the zoning commission. Upon its report the city council
or board of trustees may adopt the proposed variation or amend-
ment, with or without change, or may refer it back to the board
for further consideration. Any proposed variation or amendment
which fails to receive the approval of the board of appeals shall
not be passed except by the favorable vote of two-thirds of all of
the members of the city council in cities or of the members of the
board of trustees in villages or incorporated towns."
As will be noticed from reading the terms of the 1921 act,
cities which adopted zoning were required to provide for boards
of appeals, but these boards were given power only to recommend
variations, and the variations from or amendments to ordinances
enacted under the terms of the act were in all cases to be made
by ordinance. In other words, the board had no power to vary the
strict letter of the zoning ordinance. During the winter of 1923
there was agitation for a more useful board of appeals,2" and the
legislature of that year passed an amendment which gave the
board of appeals the right to vary the terms of the ordinance :20
"Section 3. All ordinances passed under the terms of this Act
shall be enforced by such officer of the city, village or incorporated
town as may be designated by ordinance. The regulations by this
Act authorized, may provide that a board of appeals may determine
and vary their application in harmony with their general purpose
and intent and in accordance with general or specific rules therein
contained."
It should be noted that this act does not require zoned cities
to provide for a board of appeals and that the act allows the
variance of the application of the ordinance. The act also makes
detailed provisions for the appointment and procedure of the
board, for appeals before the board and the decision of such ap-
peals, and for the review of the board's decisions by writ of cer-
tiorari .2
7
The Chicago zoning ordinance was passed by the city council
April 5, 1923, and went into operation on May 15 of that year. It
makes provision for a zoning board of appeals and for the guidance
25See Proposed Amendment to the Illinois Zoning Enabling Act supra.
note 22.
26111. Laws 1923, p. 268.
27Compare the Illinois act with the Standard State Zoning Enabling
Act sec. 7 p. 9.
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of the board makes specific mention of certain types of cases in
which hardship may be found to exist, and in which a "variation"
may be wise and permissible .2 Moreover, the statute allows the
board to vary from the strict letter of the ordinance "where there
are practical difficulties or unnecessary hardship."
Acting under this authority, the Chicago board of appeals has
rendered a great service to municipal zoning in that city. An
investigating committee of the city of Cleveland made this com-
ment upon the work of the Chicago board :2.
"The Chicago Board of Appeals visits the premises covered
by every application, and a skilled engineer in the employ of the
commission makes a careful survey of the situation in each case,
his report to the board being one of the principal factors con-
sidered by them in the determination of the application. The
Chicago ordinance required that the board be made up of a repre-
sentative of the architects, the real estate men, the legal profes-
sion (?), -the building contractors and an engineer.30 Your com-
mittee is satisfied that a great deal of the success of the zoning law
in Chicago and the reason why it is so enthusiastically supported
there arises from the fact that so careful and satisfactory a board
supervises its operation."
When the Chicago land owner seeks a building permit and
his application is denied by the building department as being con-
trary to the zoning ordinance, he may petition the board of ap-
peals for a variance of the ordinance. Three things are done by
the board to prevent a bad decision: (1) The board causes maps
to be made showing the bulk and use of all surrounding buildings.
Each member of the board is supplied with a map and necessary
data and has it before him at the hearing of the appeal; (2) The
board makes a personal inspection of the premises. No "com-
mittee" is sent out by the board, but, as a general thing, each mem-
ber visits the locality in question, two making their observation on
Friday, two on Monday and the other one at his convenience;
(3) Direct notice is given to the adjoining owners and a public
hearing is held in the presence of the board before the decision
is made.
An idea of the importance of the Chicago board of appeals
can be obtained from these figures which show the number and
variety of decisions made by the board since its organization:
28Sec. 29, (d) (1)-(17) See Pond. Another Version of the Leopold
Case and its Effect on Zoning (October 1925) Chicago Realtor 38:10.29(December 17, 1924) City Record, Official Publication p. 6.
3ONot required by the 1923 Statute.
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July 2 to
Dec. 31
1923 1924 1925
Granted ............... 123 93 227
Denied ................. 63 114 202
Dismissed .............. 16 8 34
Withdrawn ............. 2 24 41
Appeals ................ 8 21
Pending ............... 5 8 2
Granted on condition ....... 93 181
M odified ............... ... 1 14
Granted temporarily ........ ... 5
Granted partly and partly
denied .............. ...... 9
Reversed ............... .... ... 4
Stricken from the docket ..... 1
TotaL .................. 226 362 720
An afternoon spent in the "court" room of the board of ap-
peals while public hearings are being held should be of great in-
terest to lawyer and layman alike. One would be led to note the
great number of apparently insoluble cases that come before the
board under the zoning ordinance. Most of the cases that come
before the board of appeals are cases where the application of the
ordinance causes individual hardship. Another fact that would
impress one is the intense earnestness of the pleas and testimony
made to the chairman of the board. Zoning protects the homes
of individuals who become greatly wrought up at a contemplated
invasion of their residential district by injurious uses. One is
impressed by the difficult position of the board. It cannot legislate
and can, therefore, make no fundamental changes in the ordi-
nance, nevertheless, in framing its decisions so as to keep the ques-
tion of the constitutionality of zoning out of the courts, the board
constantly is faced with the necessity of allowing a use forbidden
by the ordinance, but which is conducted in a way that is per-
fectly harmless in itself.
The board of appeals is a body of experts at compromising.
Many decisions are made upon certain conditions, when either the
denial or the granting of the petition would be subject to com-
plaint. So successful has been the Chicago board of appeals at
compromising with the parties concerned, and at adjusting rival
claims, that no case involving the decisions of this board has been
reviewed by an appellate court on certiorari, and from the figures
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shown above, we find that in spite of the fact that the board de-
cided about twice as many cases in 1925 as in 1924, there were
no appeals from the decisions made. 1308 cases have been de-
cided by the Chicago board of appeals and only 29 have been ap-
pealed.
It is not easy to select decisions from the hundreds handed
down by the Chicago board of appeals to illustrate the work of
the board. No two cases are alike and no precedent can be found
which can be applied in all other cases of somewhat the same
nature. Nevertheless, it is instructive to study the problems
found in the following cases. The ordinance provides that where
a business building, built on a corner lot, extends back to a resi-
dential or apartment lot facing a side street, the rear corner shall
be cut off at an angle so as to join the side street lot at the building
line rather than at the street line.3 Obviously such an angle
would be unnecessary should there be an alley separating the
two lots so it is the practice of the board in such cases to require
the rear wall of the building to be finished with pressed brick or
to require the alley doors to be closed as a condition precedent to
the removing of the rear angle cut-off requirement.
Churches nearly always are allowed to exceed the volume limits
if the result will not be harmful to the surrounding property. In
one case a factory owner desired to extend his building into a
residential district. He was required to put in a vent stack, to
buy an adjoining lot, and to preserve the amenities of the neighbor-
hood. Another factory owner was allowed to make an extension
on condition that the chimney be raised forty feet and a gas drier
be installed. An owner of a lot desired to erect a garage thereon,
but his plans were refused because the ordinance required the
building to be set back three feet along the alley side, and his
plans had made no provision for this requirement. The garage
was to be used for storage and since a certain width was necessary
to provide for the parking of cars within the building the owner
claimed that he could not leave the three foot strip along the
alley side. The board allowed that part of the garage which was
to be used for storage to extend to the alley line so long as the
building remined a one story building. In a neighborhood, zoned
commercial, but filled with the lowest grade of manufacturing
uses, the board allowed a junk yard to be established upon a two
U1Sec. 22 (e).
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year permit. At the end of the two years another inspection will
be made and if the neighborhood has "cleaned up" the permit
will be revoked. Another such case involved a stoneyard, which
was allowed as a nonconforming use, the permit being for seven
years. This lot was located near a railroad and other non-con-
forming uses served as a buffer between the stoneyard and the
more restricted uses of the neighborhood.
Having made its decision, the board of appeals has no power
of enforcement. To many this seems to be a defect in the zoning
law, and it has been advocated that the board should be made an
arm of the executive in zoning matters. All that can be done at
present is through letters to the building department or the legal
department of the city. Some will point to the method of amend-
ing the ordinance as a defect in the zoning law.3 2 There is noth-
ing to prevent a disappointed applicant from bringing his claim to
his alderman, who may be induced to propose an amendment. The
proposal will be investigated by the committee of the council and
may be adopted by the ordinary vote. Notice is not given directly
but is published in the official journal and complaint has been
made that amendments have been made without the adjoining
owners being aware of the situation. The zoning ordinance should
be changed only after a public hearing at which the neighborhood
is present and this cannot be secured without mailed notices to
the owners and householders. The board of appeals cannot block
an amendment or compel a two-thirds vote as provided by the
enabling act of 1921. 3' The only recourse in the case of an unne-
cessary amendment is in protest to the mayor in the hope that the
contemplated change will be vetoed.
Zoning is yet in the stage of development and in the applica-
tion and the enforcement of the zoning ordinance we find many
defects. At present, it seems that the board of appeals is ham-
pered by the division of powers and the lack of organization com-
mon to municipal government. The newness of the zoning move-
ment and the lack of detailed knowledge on the part of the legis-
32The Proceedings of the City Council shows that the zoning ordinance
was amended 109 times between April 21, 1924 and April 1, 1925. Fifteen of
these changes were vetoed by the mayor. About three-fourths of the
changes were to provide for less restricted regulations. Between October
17, 1924 and June 3, 1925 there were 49 amendments lowering the stand-
ards, the property affected having a street frontage of 35.4 miles. Between
May 1923 and July 1924 there were 71 amendments lowering the standards.
the property affected having a frontage of 53 miles.
3Ill. Laws 1921, p. 182.
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lative and executive departments of the city necessarily hampers
enforcement and creates difficulties for the board of appeals, but
in spite of that, the board of appeals seems to be doing a very
important work in a sane and efficient manner.
III. THE NEw YORK BOARD OF APPEALS
Aside from the limitation of the height of buildings and scat-
tered piecemeal zoning ordinances, we can say that zoning began in
New York City. The enabling act was passed in 19141' and two
years later the zoning resolution was adopted by the city. Both
the enabling act and the zoning resolution have been widely copied
and the influence of these acts and the counsel of such men as
Edward M. Bassett, Herbert S. Swan, and Frank B. Williams
has been of great value in securing the adoption of zoning in other
states.
It is interesting to note that the first enabling act made no pro-
vision for a board of appeals, the necessity for such a board not
being apparent at that time. However, as the zoning resolution
was being framed, the zoning commission came to the conclusion
that some board of appeals or adjustment was necessary. Instead
of seeking statutory authority for the creation of a new board of
appeals the zoning commission attempted to make use of a board
of appeals whi6h had been provided by the legislature in 1916 3
with power "to exercise its discretion within limits in granting
permits for buildings in exceptional situations and to review the
decisions of the building commissioners." 30 The New York City
Building Zone Resolution, adopted July 25, 1916, provided that
the "Board of Appeals, created by chapter 503 of the laws of 1916,
may, in appropriate cases, after public notice and hearing and
subject to appropriate conditions and safeguards, determine and
vary the application of the use district regulations herein estab-
lished in harmony with their general purpose and intent as fol-
lows:"' 3 Then follow subsections (a) to (g) giving specific
examples of situations where a variation of the resolution might be
34N. Y. Laws 1914, ch. 470; amd. (1916) ch. 497. Greater New York
Charter secs. 242-a and 242-b.35N. Y. Laws 1916, ch. 503 sec. 6. New York Charter secs. 718d.
719-5. The board was composed of the appointed members of the board
of standards and appeals and the chief of the uniformed force of the fire
department.38Bassett, Board of Appeals in Zoning supra p. 9.3TArt. II, sec. 7.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
advisable. Another section"' allowed variance in cases of "prac-
tical difficulties or unnecessary hardship."
The zoning commission which framed the New York ordinance
made the above provision under the assumption that this could
be done because of the similarity to the powers provided by the
act of 1916. This proved to be erroneous as was shown in the
case of People ex rel. Beinert v. Miller.39 Here the court said :40
"The board of estimate having been vested by the legislature
with the power of framing the regulations and restrictions pro-
vided for by the acts of 1914 and 191641 could not, in the absence
of express legislative authority, depute to an inferior board the
power to dispense in its discretion with compliance with such regu-
lations. If the board of estimate has such a power to be exer-
cised or not in its discretion, it could not delegate such discretion
to a subordinate administrative or ministerial board.'
42
This case illustrates the error of giving the power to vary or
adjust the zoning ordinance, which was provided for by statute
and had the force of a statute, 43 to a board created by a different
statute and for a different purpose. Only the board of estimate
and apportionment had the power to pass a zoning ordinance, act-
ing upon the recommendation of the zoning commission, and the
board of estimate and apportionment had no authority to invest
this board of appeals with the power to vary the ordinance.
The weakness of this board of appeals had been recognized
before the decision in the Beinert Case had been handed down,
and the legislature had amended sections 242a and 242b of the
Greater New York Charter by adding the following :44
"Said regulations shall be enforced by the superintendent of
buildings of each borough and the tenement house commissioner
and the fire commissioner under the rules and regulations of the
board of standards and appeals. Said regulations of the board
of estimate and apportionment may provide that the board of
appeals may determine and vary their application in harmony with
their general purpose and intent and in accordance with general
and specific rules therein contained."
38Art. V, sec. 20 (now sec. 21)
39(1917) 100 Misc. Rep. 318, 165 N. Y. S. 602.
40(1917) 100 Misc. Rep. 318, 326, 165 N. Y. S. 602.
41The enabling acts. See note 34.
42 Citing Birdsall v. Clark, (1878) 73 N. Y. 73; Phelps v. City of New
York, (1889) 112 N. Y. 216, 220, 19 N. E. 408, 2 L. R. A. 626; Ontario
Knitting Co. v. State, (1912) 205 N. Y. 409, 416, 98 N. E. 909.
43Matter of Stubbe, (1917) 220 N. Y. 459, 465. 116 N. E. 372; West-
side Mortgage Company v. Leo, (1919) 174 N. Y. S. 451.
44N. Y. Laws 1917, ch. 601.
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The charter provisions regarding the board of appeals were
also amended by adding the following :45
"They shall also hear and decide all matters referred to them
or upon which they are required to pass under any resolution of
the board of estimate and apportionment adopted pursuant to sec-
tions two hundred and forty-two-a and two hundred and forty-
two-b of this chapter. [This section continues :4'] No member
of the board shall pass upon any question in which he or any cor-
poration in which he is a stock holder or security holder is inter-
ested.
"Hearings on appeals shall be before at least five members of
the board of appeals, and the concurring vote of five members of
the board of appeals shall be necessary to a decision.'7
"The words board of appeals when used in this chapter refer
to said appointed members of the board of standards and appeals
and the chief of the uniformed force of the fire department, when
acting under the powers conferred by this section."
In 1920 this section was added to by the provision that the
chairman may administer oaths and compel the attendance of
witnesses. 4
The New York board of appeals has become a very important
"adjunct" to the zoning plan. The rules which govern the ac-
tivities of this board have been copied in practically all the states
that have provided for the board of appeals. Almost all the
reported cases involving the procedure of a board of appeals come
from New York and the precedents there laid Jbwn have become
binding in other jurisdictions. Hence, a review of these cases
should be of interest to the legal profession in othet states.
IV. LEADING CASES
While there are cases in which decisions of the board of
appeals have been reversed it is the rule that courts of record
uphold the board of appeals on certiorari unless there is a clear
violation of the limited powers of the board. By People ex rel.
Healy v. Leo49 an order, sustaining a writ of certiorari and annul-
ling the proceedings of the New York board of appeals, was re-
versed and the decision of the board was affirmed. The court
said :50
45Greater New York Charter, sec. 718d.
"°The remainder of this section was in N. Y. Laws 1916, ch. 503 sec.
6 (Amd. to the Charter 718d).47See change in N. Y. Laws 1920, ch. 743 sec. 1.
48N. Y. Laws 1920, ch. 348.
49(1920) 194 App. Div. 973, 185 N. Y. S. 948.
10(1920) 194 App. Div. 973, 185 N. Y. S. 948.
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"Applications to vary the zoning regulations in a particular
case are addressed largely to the discretion of the board of appeals
which will not be interfered with by the court except in clear cases
of abuse of such discretion.""
The presumption in favor of the board of appeals is well
stated by the court in the case of People ex rel. Werner v/.
Walsh :52
"While the court has been given express power to review the
determination of the board of appeals and to reverse or to affirm
wholly or partly, or to modify the decision brought up for re-
view, and may even take additional evidence upon the hearing,
there exists, nevertheless, a presumption in favor of the correct-
ness of the determination arrived at by the board of appeals.
"In the present case it does not appear from the record that
the board abused its discretion, or acted in bad faith or that its
action was unreasonable, arbitrary, discriminatory, or illegal, in
refusing to vary the application of the use district regulation; and
in such instance we may not substitute the court's determination
for that of the duly constituted municipal authority. '5 3
In discussing this presumption in favor of the board of ap-
peals, the court in People ex rel. Ruth v. Leo54 made this state-
ment:
"The hearings before the board of appeals are not intended
merely as the first step in an application to the supreme court
for a permit, and the supreme court should not upon the hearing
of a writ of certiorari reverse a determination of the board of
appeals, even though the justice presiding might himself have
arrived at a different conclusion, if the application had been sub-
mitted to him in the first instance and he had a right to exercise
his own untrammeled discretion. . . . Each application must be
determined upon its own merits, and persons aggrieved by a deci-
sion of the board of appeals have a right to appeal from such a
decision, but such deoisions in nowise affect property holders in
other sections of the city and in nowise bind the board of appeals
when new applications are made for similar relief." 5
5"Citing People ex rel. Kennedy v. Brady. (1901) 166 N. Y. 44. 49. 59
N. E. 701; People ex rel. Facey v. Leo, (1920) 110 Misc. Rep. 516. 180
N. Y. S. 553: affd. 193 Apip. Div. 910, 180 N. Y. S. 554; People ex rel.
Beinert v. Miller, (1919) 188 Aixp. Div. 113. 178 N. Y. S. 297. See Alt-
schul v. Ludwig, (1916) 216 N. Y. 459. 111 N. E. 216.
52(1925) 212 App. Div. 635, 209 N. Y. S. 454, 458.
53See People ex rel. McAvoy v. Leo, (1919) 109 Misc. Rep. 255. 178
N. Y. S. 513.
54(March 29, 1921) N. Y. Law Jour. p. 2195-6, (1921) 197 App. Div.
942, 188 N. Y. S. 945.
"5People ex rel. Helvetia Realty Co. v. Leo, (1921) 183 N. Y. S. 37:
aff. 195 App. Div. 887, 185 N. Y. S. 949. 231 N. Y. 619. 132 N. E. 912:
People ex rel. Sondern v. Walsh, (1919) 108 Misc. Rep. 193. 178 N. Y. S.
192; Westside Mortgage Co. v. Leo. (1919) 174 N. Y. S. 451: People
ex rel. Flegenheimer v. Leo, (1918) 186 App. Div. 893, 172 N. Y. S. 912.
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In regard to the reconsideration of decisions made by the
board of appeals and the review and modification of its own
rulings, People ex rel. Brennan v. Walsh58 holds that the board
of appeals is a quasi-judicial body, and should not ordinarily be
permitted to sit in review of its own decisions and revoke action
once duly taken. But the court said :17
"It seems more reasonable to conclude that there is power to
recall and correct orders than to hold that the sole method of
correcting is in the courts through a writ of certiorari. But the
power to reconsider is not an arbitrary one, and its exercise should
be granted only when there is justification and good cause for such
action."58
People ex rel. Swedish Hospital v. Leo5" holds that there is
nothing in the statute which gives the board power to reopen and
review its acts. It was declared that :60
"The board of appeals can in no sense act other than in a
quasi judicial capacity. It does not perform a single administra-
tive or legislative act. As its name implies it is an appellate tri-
bunal. It passes upon matters formally brought to its attention
much the same as courts. It hears evidence and argument and
decides controversies as the evidence dictates. It cannot act with-
out some evidence. The record here shows that it denied the appli-
cation for good reason and upon sufficient evidence to sustain its
conclusion. There was not a scintilla of evidence presented to the
board to warrant it in changing its final disposition of this pro-
ceeding." '61
In the case of McGarrv v. Walsh62 Judge Manning upheld the
ruling quoted above and said :"'a
"The appellants maintain that the board had the power to
correct, reverse, or amend its previous decision, and that it was
proper in this case, since the owner would have suffered a grave
injustice if its action has been permitted to stand, and that if the
board has not such power, and 'finality in zone law matters were
the policy of the law, the board of appeals would cease to exist,'
and that the very essence of the statutes and ordinances is to
authorize variations, make changes, and then further changes, in
56(1922) 195 N. Y. S. 264.
57Ibid., at 266.
58in this case the court held that there was no justification for such
review.
59(1923) 120 Misc. Rep. 355, 198 N. Y. S. 397.
60(1923) 120 Misc. Rep. 355, 358, 198 N. Y. S. 397.
61Citing People ex rel. Cotton v. Leo, (1920) 194 App. Div. 921, 184
N. Y. S. 943. See People ex rel. Smith v. Clark, (1903) 174 N. Y. 259.
66 N. E. 819; Osterhoudt v. Rigney, (1885) 98 N. Y. 222, 39 N. E. 397;
People ex rel. Chase v. Wemple, (1895) 144 N. Y. 478, 39 N. E. 397.
62(1925) 213 App. Div. 289, 210 N. Y. S. 286.
62a(1925) 213 App. Div. 289, 210 N. Y. S. 286, 295.
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the application of the fixed rules, and that the reason for its very
existence is to the direct contrary of the legal policy that judg-
ments of courts between private litigants, once legally made, must
forever stand. If this is so, the board of appeals is a law unto
itself, and I do not know when it could be considered that any
action of the board is final, and yet its rules provide for a final
determination, which the board says cannot curtail powers given
by the legislature.
3
Although the law seems to be that the board of appeals cannot
reconsider a decision upon the same evidence, it was held by
Barker v. Boettger64 that mere irregularities or informalities may
be corrected or altered by the board without violation of the above
rule.
The Rhode Island enabling act 5 authorizes appeals to a board
of appeals and requires the board to fix a reasonable time for hear-
ing the appeal, to give notice to parties interested, and to decide
the appeal within a reasonable time. It was held in the case of
Richard v. Board of Review of Woonsocket" that this statute did
not authorize the board of appeals to table, for an indefinite time,
an appeal from the action of the city building inspector in issuing
a certain permit. This ruling seems to be a reasonable one because
one of the chief reasons for the existence of a board of appeals
is that it is able to act promptly and settle questions without the
delay which would inevitably result if the question were left to the
city council.
The enabling act for New York City"7 provides that hearings
on appeals are to be before at least five members of the board
of appeals, and that "the concurring vote of five members of the
board of appeals shall be necessary to a decision." This provi-
sion of the statute was "clumsily drawn" and a number of ques-
tions were raised as to its real meaning. For example, suppose
that five members meet and four are in favor of the appellant and
one is opposed to him. Obviously a decision favorable to the
appellant, at that time, is impossible, but does it follow that failure
to decide in his favor is to be interpreted as a decision against
him? This question was discussed in the cases of People ex rel.
63Contra: Shackelford v. City of Denver, (D.C. Col. 1925) Reported
in the Rocky Mountain News July 25, 1925. See Altschul v. Ludwig, (1916)
216 N. Y. 459, 116 N. E. 216.
64(1924) 124 Misc. Rep. 461, 208 N. Y. S. 295.
61R. I. Laws 1923, ch. 2315; amd. R. I. Gen. Laws 1923, secs. 796-802.
6(R. I. 1925) 129 Atl. 736.
67N. Y. Laws 1916, ch. 503,-sec. 718 subd. (d). N. Y. Laws 1917, ch.
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Cockroft v. Miller6 8 and People ex rel. N. Y. C. Ry. Co. v. Leo.09
Fortunately the criticism of this section has secured the provision
in the General City Law of the state of New York 0 that the
"concurring vote of four members of the board shall be necessary
to reverse any order, requirement, decision, or determination of
any such administrative official, or to decide in favor of the appli-
cant (on) any matter upon which they are required to pass under
any such ordinance or to effect any variation in such ordinance."
This provision was copied into the Standard State Zoning Ena-
bling Act7 ' and has been generally followed by other states."
The board of appeals may grant relief subject to conditions
and by this method obtain results which could not be obtained in
any other way. The board may make aesthetic requirements, as
when it compels the alteration of the plans of a business building
to conform to the amenities of the residential neighborhood before
granting a permit for its extension into a residential zone. Some-
times the conditions are to preserve the quiet and comfort of the
residence district "as when the permit requires the business struc-
ture to have its entrances all on the business street, thus to some
extent keeping employees and customers off the residential
street."73
People ex rel. Helvetia Realty Co. v. Leo -- was a review by
certiorari of a decision of the New York board of appeals. A
building had been constructed in 1905 of four stories, with plans
to raise it to nine stories at a later time. After the zoning law
went into effect the owner desired to build the addition and there
arose the question as to the space to be left in the rear between
the intervenor's building and the relator's building which abuts it
in the rear. The board of appeals allowed the intervenor (owner)
to carry the old wall up straight instead of being set back "on
condition that the additional portion of the rear wall of the struc-
ture shall be faced with cream or white glazed brick and that the
upper sash of any windows placed in said wall shall be glazed with
prism glass." The board had found that the petitioner's wall was
in the shadow of its own building and could not in any event
68(1919) 187 App. Div. 704. 176 N. Y. S. 206.
69(1918) 105 Misc. Reg. 372, 173 N. Y. S. 217.
7OGen. City Law ch. 483 sec. 81-1.
71Standard Act supra, sec. 7. p. 11.
72For example Ill. Laws 1923, p. 269.
73Williams, Law of City Planning and Zoning 572, note 52.
74(1920) 183 N. Y. S. 37; affd. 195 App. Div. 887, 185 N. Y. S. 949,
231 N. Y. 619, 132 N. E. 912.
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receive sunlight directly from the south and the only light the
windows could have must be reflected light from the north, hence
under the conditions imposed would have better light than if the
owner's building wall were set back but made of ordinary brick.
This was held to be a proper exercise of the board's discretion.
In People ex rel. Beinert v. Miller 5 we find that the New
York board of appeals had reversed the determination of the
superintendent of buildings that a riding academy could not be
constructed in a certain district of New York City. This deci-
sion was made upon certain conditions as to the location and con-
struction of the proposed academy. The lower court held that
the board was limited to action upon the plans before it and since
those plans were not acceptable, the board should have affirmed
the refusal of the superintendent of buildings. The court said :7
"Its decision was in effect to promise in advance of any appli-
cation by the owner of the property for approval of new plans
which should meet the objection, that the board would approve
such new plans upon appeal, whatever might be the attitude of the
superintendent in respect thereof, so far as this question was con-
cerned."
Upon appeal77 Judge Blackmar made the following state-
ment :78
"In doing this we think the board of appeals did not alter or
modify the zoning resolution. . . In this case the board made
the investigation; it prescribed, as a condition for the protection
of the adjacent residential district, that the buildings should be
limited to the business district and that solid walls, without open-
ings, should be built on the side toward the residential district.
All this seems in harmony with and not in derogation of the reso-
lution. . . . In fine, the function of the board of appeals in this
respect is not to vary the resolution but to 'determine and vary the
application of the use district regulations ... in harmony with
their general purpose and intent.' We think the board of appeals
had jurisdiction to make the determination that was annulled at
Special Term."
As we have stated before one of the chief services of the board
of appeals is in preventing the question of the constitutionality of
zoning ordinancs from arising in the courts in every case of hard-
ship. Nearly all of the hardship cases are settled in the hearing
before the board but the individual is given his appeal from such
75(1919) 100 Misc. Rep. 318, 165 N. Y. S. 602.
78(1919) 100 Misc. Rep. 318, 326, 165 N. Y. S. 602.
77(1919) 188 App. Div. 113, 176 N. Y. S. 378.
78(1919) 188 App. Div. 113, 117, 176 N. Y. S. 378.
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decisions by way of certiorari. It is generally provided in the
state enabling acts that persons aggrieved by a decision of the
board of appeals may present to a court of record a petition, duly
verified, setting forth that such decision is illegal and specifying
the grounds of that illegality. Upon the presentation of this
petition the court may allow a writ of certiorari to review the
decision. The board of appeals is given at least ten days for a
return, using copies of the papers acted upon by it, and this return
is to show the grounds of the decision appealed from. The court
can take testimony and may then "reverse or affirm, wholly or
partly, or may modify the decision brought up for review.""T
Upon appeal by certiorari the court will review the "official or
judicial action" of the board, 0 but if a mandamus issued often
we would find the court compelling the local official to issue a
building permit in spite of the zoning ordinances. 8'
In New York it has been held that relief by way of man-
damnus will be denied when the petitioner has not sought relief
by appealing to the board of appeals. In People ex rel. Broadway
Realty Co. v. Wals. 8 2 the court said:
"As the relator failed at first to exhaust its remedy by appeal to
the board of appeals it was not in a position to apply to the court
for relief by way of mandamus, and its motion for a final order
for a peremptory writ was properly denied." 83
In People ex rel. Sondern v. Wals101' we find a similar ruling,
the court saying :85
"But since the remedy of revocation lies, too, with the board
of appeals, the unrelenting rule of judicial courts is not to rush to
mandamus administrative officials until all of their machinery for
action has been tried and found wanting by the aggrieved party.
Therefore, the writ itself is refused, although the construction
asked for is given." 86
79Standard Act supra, sec. 7, p. 11.8038 C. J. 545.
BlAs is regularly done in New Jersey. See Baker, Zoning Legisla-
tion (February, 1926) 11 Cornell Law Quarterly 164.
82(1922) 203 App. Div. 468, 475, 196 N. Y. S. 672.83Citing People ex rel. Walsh v. Kleinert, (1921) 200 App. Div. 836.
191 N. Y. S. 947.84(1919) 108 Misc. Rep. 193, 178 N. Y. S. 192.
85 (1919) 108 Misc. Rep. 193, 195, 178 N. Y. S. 192.
8 
'It is very generally held that except in so far as changes have
been introduced by special statutory provisions, the writ of mandamus, being
an extraordinary writ, will not issue where there is another plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law. According
to well established principles it is not the office of the court to establish
a right but to define and impose a duty; it does not supersede, but rather
supplies the want of legal remedies." 38 C. J. 558 and cases cited. See
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In regard to the injunctive power of the courts the decision in
Wivitridge v. Park, Calestock, et al. contained this statement :88
"The injunctive power of this court is therefore not available
in behalf of a private individual upon the theory that the busi-
ness use of a building in a residence district established under the
zoning statute constitutes a nuisance. . . . Moreover, the resolu-
tion of the board of estimate and apportionment prescribes the
remedies for its enforcement and the legal procedure and penalties
in case of violation thereof, and it may well be argued that the
remedies prescribed by the resolution are exclusive."
If the board of appeals has been applied to and the petitioner's
request is not granted it is unlikely that a court will allow him a
mandamus or an injunction. As Mr. Bassett says :"
"The court trying the case would say that an expert body
especially constituted under the law of the state and appointed
by the city had given him this day in court and had found that his
application was not meritorious. His legal counsel would prob-
ably advise him against mandamus and would apply for a writ of
certiorari to review the action of the board of appeals. This
review is usually predicated on the constitutionality of the or-
dinance. In the five years of the operation of the zoning resolu-
tion of the city of New York not a single writ of mandamus under
it against any one of the borough building superintendents has
come up for trial."
In New Jersey we find a great deal of confusion in the cases
involving zoning. Lutz v. Kaltenbach0 holds that under the New
Jersey statute9' remedy by appeal to the board of appeals must be
pursued before resort to mandamusY2  However, other cases
have held that it is not necessary to apply to the board of appeals
before recourse to mandamus.93
The New Jersey courts have ignored the statute providing for
appeal from decisions of the board of appeals by way of certiorari
and have made a number of decisions reversing the ruling of the
board and issuing a writ of mandamus to compel the issuance of
a building permit in violation of the zoning ordinance. Falco v.
People v. Holmes, (1924) 312 IIl. 284, 143 N. E. 835; Jones v. Gutenburg,
(1901) 66 N. J. L. 659, 51 Atl. 274; People v. Craven, (1914) 210 N. Y.
443, 104 N. E. 922; 25 Col. L. Rev. 1048.
87(1917) 100 Misc. Rep. 367, 165 N. Y. S. 640, affd. 179 App. Div. 884,
165 N. Y. S. 640.88(1917) 165 N. Y. S. at 642.
89Board of Appeals in Zoning, supra, p. 6.
90(N. J. 1925) 128 Atl. 421.
9'N. J. Laws 1924, ch. 146.92Citing Florenzie v. East Orange, (1916) 88 N. J. L. 438, 97 Atd. 260.93New Jersey Land Co. v. Scott, (N.J. 1923) 126 At. 173; Losdick v.
Binda, (N.J. 1925) 128 Atl. 619.
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Kaltenbach9 was a case of this nature and in answer to the re-
spondent's argument that mandamus is not a proper remedy to
review the proceedings of a statutory tribunal, the court said :0
"The answer to this is that the present proceeding does
not contemplate a review of the action and proceedings of the
board of adjustment, but seeks the assistance of this court's pre-
rogative writ to compel the building inspector to perform an ad-
ministrative act which it is asserted he in law and fact should have
performed, namely, issue the permit applied for. 'The fact that
another remedy may exist for reaching the evil complained of
will not avail to prevent the resort of mandamus, unless such other
remedy is specific and adequate.'9 6 We have already pointed out
that certiorari is unavailing and inadequate, therefore, resort to
mandamus is proper. We think the fact of this case makes the
finding in Ignaciunas v. Risley"r controlling. 9 8
In considering these cases we should remember that New
Jersey courts have rendered a number of decisions against the
constitutionality of zoning ordinances. The enabling acts of New
Jersey have not been condemned directly but the courts of that
state have refused to consider zoning ordinances as proper appli-
cation of the police power.9 9 It is doubtful if these cases will
have much effect in the states that have settled the question of
constitutionality of zoning.
The New York statute'0 0 required that the return of the board
on certiorari "must concisely set forth such other facts as may
be pertinent and material and to show the grounds of the deci-
sion." It was held by People ex rel. Parry v. Walsh"' that a
return by the board that the reason for denying the relator's appli-
cation was "the best interests of the community" and to prevent
the "desecration of the community" failed to satisfy the require-
91(N.J. 1925) 128 Atl. 394.
95Ibid, at 395.96Citing Lay v. Hoboken, (1907) 75 N. J. L. 315, 67 At. 1024 and cases
therein cited.
97(1923) 98 N. J. L. 712, 121 At. 783. This is the leading New Jersey
case which holds zoning unconstitutional.98Accord: Becker v. Dowling, (N.J. 1925) 128 At. 395; Union Devel.
Co. v. Kaltenback (N. J. 1925) 128 At. 396; Nelson Bldg. Co. v. Binda.
(N.J. 1925) 128 Atl. 618; Builders Realty Co. v. Bigelow, (N.J. 1925)
Adv. Rep. Vol III No. 22 p. 540; Shapiro v. Brennan (N.J. 1925) Adv.
Rep. Vol. III No. 22 p. 543: Plymouth Co. v. Bigelow (1925) 2 N. J.
Misc. 711, 129 Atl. 203; Melrose Realty Co. v. Franke, (N.J. 1925) Adv.
Rep. Vol. III No. 2 p. 43; Prince v. Board of Adjustment (N.J. 1925)
129 At. 123; Summit Co. v. Board of Adjustment (N.J. 1925) 129 Ad.
819; Krumgold v. Mayor and Aldermen of Jersey City, (N.J. 1925) N. J.
Adv. Rep. Vol. III No. 43, p. 5146.99See Baker, Constitutionality of Zoning Laws, supra p. 231.2oON. Y. Laws 1916, ch. 503 sec. 719a.
101(1923) 121 Misc. Rep. 631, 202 N. Y. S. 48.
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ments of the statute. In the case of People ex rel. Kannensohn
Holditg Corp. v. Walsh"'0  we find that the court states that the
return to the writ must be more than a general denial of the
petition.
"It must concisely set forth such other facts as may be per-
tinent and material to show the grounds of the decision. The
return in this case sets forth the minutes of the proceedings before
the board and as its decision a resolution which failed to show that
it decided the appeal for any good reason."
Hence, the writ of certiorari was sustained and the board's
decision was declared contrary to the weight of the evidence?103
In the case of In re Forbes"° the court made the following
statement in regard to appeal from the court reviewing the deci-
sion of the board of appeals :105
"The writ of certiorari authorized by the act'00 is a special
statutory writ, and the proceedings with respect thereto are con-
trolled by the statute creating the board of appeals and the right
to review its decisions. The statute does not authorize a review
of the judgment of the court, and, there being no right of review
by appeal granted by the statute, no right of appeal exists." 10'
This is the only case concerning the board of appeals that has
been decided in the state of Illinois by the supreme court and the
statute was changed and appeal from the court of review was
allowed in 1925.105
V. LIMITATIONS OF THE BOARD OF APPEALS
The board of appeals is not a legislative body and, therefore,
it has no power to change or amend zoning ordinances. How-
ever, sometimes it is difficult to draw the line which separates
cases deserving "variance" from the zoning ordinance, and cases
which can only be solved by amending the ordinance itself.109 The
board of appeals is created by legislative enactment and its powers
are limited strictly to the statute, but the statutes do little to set
102(1923) 120 Misc. Rep. 467, 470, 199 N. Y. S. 534.
103See Westside Mortgage Co. v. Leo, (1919) 174 N. Y. S. 451; People
ex rel. McAvoy v. Leo, (1919) 109 Misc. Rep. 255, 178 N. Y. S. 513.
104(1925) 316 II. 141, 146 N. E. 448.
105(1925) 316 II. 141, 142, 146 N. E. 448.
2o611. Laws 1923, p. 269; (1923) Smith's Sts. p. 227.
10 7 Citing Union Drainage District v. Dupino-Granger Drainage Dis-
trict, (1924) 313 III. 37, 144 N. E. 315; People v. Andrus, (1922) 299 Ill.
50, 132 N. E. 225; Drainage Comrs. v. Harms, (1909) 238 Ill. 414, 87 N. E.
277.
108111. Laws 1925, p. 244.
09Pond, Another Version of the Leopold Case and its Effect on Zon-
ing supra, p. 10.
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definite boundaries to the powers of the board. For illustration,
the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, which has been followed
by a score of states gives the board of appeals the power :110
"3. To authorize upon appeal in specific cases such variance
from the terms of the ordinance as will not be contrary to the
public interest, where, owing to special conditions, a literal enforce-
ment of the provisions of the ordinance will result in unnecessary
hardship, and so that the spirit of the ordinance shall be observed
and substantial justice done."
In New York the board of estimate and apportionment adopted
the following rule which has the force of a statute:"'
"Where there are practical difficulties or unnecessary hard-
ships in the way of carrying out the strict letter of the provi-
sions of this resolution the board of appeals shall have power in
a specific case to vary any such provision in harmony with its
gene-al purpose and intent, so that the public health, safety, and
general welfare may be secured and substantial justice done.' ' lu
The Illinois enabling act makes this provision:1'
"'Where there are practical difficulties or unnecessary hard-
ship in the way of carrying out the strict letter of such ordinance,
the board of appeals shall have the power in passing upon ap-
peals, to vary or modify the application of any of the regula-
tions or provisions of such ordinance relating to the use, con-
struction or alteration of buildings or structures or the use of land,
so that the spirit of the ordinance shall be observed, public safety
and welfare secured and substantial justice done."''1
Such provisions are bound to raise many questions as to the
powers of the board of appeals. What is the meaning of the
term "vary?" How far can the board go in "modifying" the or-
dinance without taldng upon itself the legislative powers reserved
to the city council? What is "unnecessary hardship?" What
standards are to be used in ascertaining the conditions which con-
stitute "practical difficulties?" How far can the board go and
still observe the "spirit of the ordinance?" The various answers
to these questions bring up once more the question of strict inter-
pretation versus liberal interpretation. Those who criticize the
board 6f appeals and its activities often claim that the board is
1 oStandard Act supra, sec. 7, p. 10.
""New York Zoning Resolution article V, sec. 20 (now sec. 21.)
1Art. V, sec. 20 and art. I, sec. 7 of the resolution contain a number
of definite provisions for the work of the board of appeals, section 7 pro-
viding for seven "Use District Exceptions"--sec. 7, subs. (a) to (g).113111. Laws 1923. p. 268, sec. 3.
124The General City Law of the State of New York ch. 483, se 81-4
has a provision much like the Illinois law except that it does not provide
for the variance of the application of the ordinance.
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prone to magnify its powers and to consider itself authorized to
decide any and every case in the way that seems most desirable to
the board, which results in the nullification of the ordinance.
These critics will advocate strict limitation of the board's powers.
However, the defenders of the board say that it is impossible for
the city council to make adjustments and that the activities of the
board keep zoning cases out of court and free the ordinance from
cases of individual hardship. They will hold that the board, com-
posed as it is of zoning experts, making a personal inspection, and
being without political ambitions, should be given the benefit of a
liberal interpretation of the statute.
In spite of such discussion over the powers of the board, nearly
all will admit that the board of appeals is a necessary adjunct to
a zoning system. In all of the states that provide for a board of
appeals by statutes, the constitutionality of which are unques-
tioned, the board has proved to be the "safety-valve" or "shock-
absorber" of the zoning plan. But the strongest supporters of
the board will say that its chief weakness is in the lack of definite
limitations upon its powers. Attacks upon the board are in most
cases directed against its tendency to overstep its "lawful func-
tions."
A number of cases have come before the courts involving the
question of the limitations of the board of appeals. In the case of
People ex rel. Beinert v. Miller'1 the court took a liberal view
of the powers of the board of appeals of New York City and
made this statement :116
"It would be physically impossible for the board of estimate
and apportionment, which in its manifold powers and duties is a
near approach to the commission form of government for a city
that in population, wealth and industries is greater than many
independent states, itself to determine and vary the application
of use district regulations as provided by section 7 of the resolu-
tion. From the necessity of the case, the power must be conferred
on some subordinate body or board. . . . In fine the function of
the board of appeals in this respect is not to vary the resolution but
to 'determine and vary the application of the use district regula-
tions . . . in harmony with their general purpose and intent.'"
In referring to article V, section 20 of the zoning resolution
(quoted above) the court in People ex rel. McAvoy v. Leo""
said:
115(1919) 188 App. Div. 113, 176 N. Y. S. 398.
116(1919) 188 App. Div. 113, 117, 176 N. Y. S. 398.
117(1919) 109 Misc. 255, 258, 178 N. Y. S. 513.
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"By this section I think it will dearly appear that the board of
appeals possessed the discretionary power to deal with specific
exceptional cases, and to vary any provision of the resolution in
harmony with its general purpose and intent, so that the public
health, safety, and general welfare may be secured and substantial
justice done, and evidently it considered this to be one of the
cases in which the discretionary power possessed by it should be
exercised; and having so determined, and acted within its juris-
diction, its determination, in my opinion, cannot be considered as
an illegal official act."
People ex rel. Smith v. Walsh"18 reviewed the granting by the
board of appeals of a permit for a garage at the corner of Pros-
pect avenue and Eleventh avenue in Brooklyn, contrary to the
letter of the zoning law. The presence of another garage on
Prospect avenue brought the case under a "Use District Excep-
tion,"" 9 but there was no like building on Eleventh avenue so as
to bring that side under the exception. The court said :'.
"But does it follow that the permit for the erection of this
garage cannot be sustained upon any other ground? May not the
broad provisions of section 20 be applied to this particular case?
I have already pointed out that there was evidence before the board
to show that this property was not available for residence or
ordinary business purposes, and that so far as the record shows,
a public garage was practically the only use available. If, there-
fore, the intervening appellant be deprived of that use by the strict
letter of the Building Zone Resolution, surely practical difficulties
and unnecessary hardships will ensue within the meaning of sec-
tion 20."'2
In the case of People ex rel. Sheldon v. Board of Appeals22 we
find that the New York board of appeals had allowed the erection
of a business building in a district zoned residential by the board
of estimate and apportionment. The board justified itself by
claiming that the case came under the "Use District Exceptions"
provided by the Building Zone Resolution'23 which gave the
board power to permit the extension of an existing building into
a more restricted district under such conditions as will safeguard
1s(1924) 211 App. Div. 205, 207 N. Y. S. 324. See Multiplex Garages
v. Walsh, (1925) 213 App. Div. 155, 210 N. Y. S. 178.
"'9Building Zone Resolution art. II, sec. 7 (e).
120(1924) 211 App. Div. 205, 216.
"'1See People ex rel. Facey v. Leo, (1921) 110 Misc. Rep. 516, 180
N. Y. S. 553; affd. 193 App. Div. 910, 183 N. Y. S. 954, 184 N. Y. S.
943, 230 N. Y. 602, 130 N. E. 910; People ex rel. Boyd v. Walsh, (April
29, 1925) N. Y. Law Jour. p. 403; Goldman v. Crowther, (Md. 1925) 128
Atl. 50, 61.
122(1922) 115 Misc. Rep. 449, 189 N. Y. S. 772.
"'Art. 1I, sec. 7 (c).
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the character of the more restricted district. The court held that
the change permitted by the board in allowing a business use in a
residential district was fundamental in character and that the ac-
tion of the board was, therefore, beyond its power. The court
made this very interesting statement :124
"The plain intent and purpose, both of the legislature and the
board of estimate and apportionment, seems to me to have been
merely to permit of the amelioration of the rigors of necessarily
general zoning regulations by eliminating the necessity for a slavish
adherence to the precise letter of the regulation where, in a given
case, little or no good on the one side, and undue hardship on the
other would result from a literal enforcement. . . . Indeed, it
appears to me to be so plain that the so-called variance is not a
variance at all, but an amendment that only the board of estimate
and apportionment itself has the power to make, as to make it
unnecessary to state reasons that must suggest themselves to any
one who gives the matter the slightest thought. '125
This decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals, 120 the
court making this statement :127
"If as the result of investigation the board of appeals shall
'determine' as it did in this specific case, that there existed unnec-
cessary hardships in the way of carrying out the strict letter of
the provisions of the zone resolution and that substantial justice
would be promoted, both to the property owners and the public
interest, its power then enlarged to 'vary', i.e., to modify or alter
in form or substance the application of the regulations of the board
of estimate and apportionment in the specific case which it did by
permitting the building which the owner 'proposed to erect upon
his lots embraced in the business district to be extended so as to
cover the lots fronting on Madison avenue. 128
In spite of such liberal statements as to the powers of the board
of appeals we find that the courts have not been hesitant to pre-
vent the exercise of unwarranted and unreasonable power by the
board, when court interference seemed necessary. People ex rel.
Cotton v. Leo 2 9 involved a decision of the board of appeals grant-
ing a permit for a garage in a residence district. The board
claimed that it had power to issue the permit under the zoning
resolution'3" which permitted the granting of the permit, provid-
124(1922) 115 Misc. 449, 452, 189 N. Y. S. 772.
125Affirmed 200 App. Div. 907, 189 N. Y. S. 772.
126(1923) 234 N. Y. 484, 138 N. E. 416.
127(1923) 234 N. Y. 484, 494, 138 N. E. 416.
128Accord: St. Basil's Church v. Kerner, (1925) 125 Misc. Rep. 526.
211 N. Y. S. 470.
129(1920) 110 Misc. Rep. 519, 180 N. Y. S. 554; affd. 194 App. Div.
921, 184 N. Y. S. 943.130Art. II, sec. 7 (g).
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ing the petitioner filed consents of the owners of eighty per cent
of the frontage "deemed by the board to be immediately affected by
the proposed garage." The court held that the board had not acted
in good faith in determining what property was immediately af-
fected and that the board's power in that regard was not arbitrary.
Moreover, the court found that there were no other garages or
business structures near the location of the proposed garage.
Strange as it may seem, that fact appeared to have been the con-
trolling one with the board and its chief reason for varying the
ordinance. The board contended that even if it could not grant
the permit as a "Use District Exception" that it had power to
grant the application under article V section 20, which allowed a
variance of the ordinance in cases of "practical difficulties or
unnecessary hardships." The court said :131
"Apparently the board's contention is that this section gives
them the power to do whatever they think is right regardless of the
provisions of the statute. But it does not grant any such power.
The board cannot wholly disregard the provisions of the statute
or of the regulations. It can merely 'vary' them to do 'substantial
justice' when the 'strict letter' of the provisions would work hard-
ships.13
2
The case of People ex rel. Gross v. Walsh'3 3 was very similar
to the Cotton case above. Here the board, failing to receive the
requisite number of consents as provided by the zoning resolution
as necessary for a "Use District Exception"' 3' sought to justify its
action in granting a, permit by claiming that it could do so under
article V section 20. The court said :'s5
"What has been done here is not to 'vary', but to appeal and
nullify express statutory enactment. If such right exists, then
the language of Article II section 7 subdivision (g) providing
for the consents and the frontage affected is surplusage, and the
board would have the arbitrary right to permit the erection of any
garage in a residence district ...
"In the instant case the respondents did what the board of
estimate and apportionment would be powerless to do, except under
certain prescribed conditions."
131110 Misc. Rep. 519, 523, 180 N. Y. S. 554.
132Citing People ex rel. Cockroft v. Miller, (1919) 187 App. Div. 704.
176 N. Y. S. 206. In People ex rel. Swedish Hospital v. Leo, (1923)
120 Misc. Rep. 355, 198 N. Y. S. 397, the court said (pr. 359): "Section
20 of the zoning resolution is usually the final refuge of the board when it
wants to do something for which there is no authority in law."
13'(1924) 124 Misc. Rep. 889, 208 N. Y. S. 571.
134Building Zone Resolution art. IT, sec. 7 (g).
'35(1924) 124 Misc. Rep. 889, 208 N. Y. S. 571.
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Perhaps the best statement as to the limitations of the board
under section 20 is found in the case of People ex rel. Brennan v.
Walsh.136 The court declared that if the board of appeals were
allowed to grant the permit in question under article V section 20
that there would be no necessity for the rules, regulations, con-
sents, and the like, provided for in the other parts of the resolu-
tion. It continued as follows :13"
"The power would be with the board in all cases. Its judg-
ment, even though arbitrarily exercised, would be final. 138 It was
only those situations which presented exceptional and unusual
conditions that permit the board to exercise its judgment in order
to relieve excessive hardships. It is not unlike similar power
given to the superintendent of buildings and other officers to waive
the strict letter of the law in the interest of preventing unneces-
sary hardships in exceptional and difficult cases. To hold other-
wise would be to submit the whole operation of the Zoning Law
to the arbitrary discretion of the board of appeals. There is a
natural desire for boards of similar jurisdiction to magnify their
power and extend it, no doubt in good faith in many instances;
but unless curbed, the magnifying of their powers would lead to
a total disregard for the statute."
There are a few other cases which might be used to throw
more light upon the subject of the limitations of the board of ap-
peals. People e.x rel. Small v. Leo"3 9 was a certiorari to review
the action of the New York board of appeals in reversing the
decision of the superintendent of buildings who had refused to
issue a building permit for a garage in the business zone of the
city. The board claimed that it acted under a "Use District Ex-
ception" provided by the Building Zone Resolution. 40 The court
held that the board was not correct in its contention because the
"alleged existing garage on the south side of President street is
100 feet west of Franklin avenue and is not within the 'business
district' zone and, therefore, does not come within the provisions
of the section. .. ."
In People ex rel. Wohl v. Leo 1' the relator had built a building
before New York City was zoned and had used the second story
for temporary living quarters. After the city was zoned he de-
136(1922) 195 N. Y. S. 264.
137(1922) 195 N. Y. S. 264, 267.
138See Altschul v. Ludwig, (1916) 216 N. Y. 459. 111 N. E. 216;
People ex rel. Tucker v. IYOench, (1887) 44 Hun 33; McGarry v. Walsh,
(1925) 213 App. Div. 289, 210 N. Y. S. 286.
139(1919) 109 Misc. Rep. 158, 178 N. Y. S. 239.
140Building Zone Resolution art. II, sec. 7 (e).
141(1919) 109 Misc. Rep. 448, 178 N. Y. S. 851.
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sired to extend his business throughout the entire building but the
permit was refused on the ground that his building was located in
a residential zone. The board of appeals denied his application
for adjustment. The court reviewed the case on certiorari and
said :142
"The use of a building designed and constructed for business is
for business and its use for business exists, where the plan of the
building is not structurally changed, although it may be actually
occupied as a dwelling. In such a case the building remains avail-
able for business, notwithstanding its temporary use for a pur-
pose for which it was not designed."
The decision of the board of appeals was reversed and the
application was granted.
In People ex rel. Hyman v. Leo'4 3 we find that the board of
appeals for New York City had granted a permit for a garage
under the provisions of the ordinance for "Use District Excep-
tions,"'1" which permitted the granting of a permit for a garage
in a street "betveen two intersecting streets in which portion there
exits a garage for more than five motor vehicles, or a stable for
more than five horses, at the time of the passage of this resolu-
tion." The court found on certiorari that opposite the premises
in question there was a partially constructed building intended to
be five or six stories high and to be used as a garage, but as yet
incompleted. The court said :"45
"In its present condition the structure is unusable as a garage,
and, moreover, may never be completed or used for garage pur-
poses. The board of appeals is strictly limited in its powers, and
must determine the matter before it upon the conditions as they
existed in the block at the time the appeal was taken. It follows
that the writ should be sustained with costs, and the resolution
of the board of standards and appeals reversed."
The board of appeals is of such recent origin that it is impos-
sible to say definitely what are the limitations upon its powers.
Very few cases have been decided upon this question and they
are cases which review the decisions of one board of appeals, that
of New York City. But from the decisions quoted we may say
that the following rules are worthy of notice.
1. Whenever the discretion of the board of appeals is involved,
the courts will presume that the board, as an expert body, has
decided correctly.
142(1919) 178 N. Y. S. 851, 853.
143(1919) 108 Misc. Rep. 39, 177 N. Y. S. 503.
'"Building Zone Resolution art. II, sec. 7 (e).
145(1919) 108 Misc. Rep. 39, 42, 177 N. Y. S. 503.
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2. The board of appeals has the right to make a reasonable
variation from the application of the zoning ordinance, but-
(a) The spirit of the ordinance must be observed.
(b) Practical difficulties and unnecessary hardships must
be proved. Only the strict letter of the law may be
waived.
(c) The change cannot be legislative in character and
must be confined to specific cases.
(d) All the rules and regulations provided by the ordinance
for specific cases or conditions must be observed be-
fore recourse to more general regulations.
(e) The board, of course, must act in good faith and
should it appear that the board acted in bad faith, or
was unreasonable, or was incorrect in the application
of the ordinance, the board will be overruled on review.
3. The board of appeals has no powers other than those granted
by the statute and those powers are open to strict interpretation
by the courts.
In conclusion, we can say that the board of appeals has been
rendering a valuable service to zoned cities. It has preserved the
constitutionality and popularity of the zoning ordinance and, more
than that, it has made the law capable of being enforced. The
hope for the zoning of the future lies largely in the work of the
board of appeals. If it can continue its splendid work but still be
restrained to its legal powers, that future seems very bright.
